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that target managers have incentive to detect earnings manipulation to ensure 
the interests of the target shareholders. Second, managers manipulate their 
earnings either downward or upward and regardless of the method of 
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resource transfer to the bidder controlling shareholder at the expense of 
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   1.  Introduction 
 
The recent wave of acquisitions is involved in a growth of industry consolidations and cross-
border operations. In France, merger and acquisitions have grown rapidly since the 90s. They 
are characterized by a small number of hostile offers and use a horizontal acquisition strategy. 
Mergers and acquisitions are considered as a transverse field of study, with a focus on the 
ability of such strategies to create value for the involved firms. Contrasted results regarding 
the bidder performance find several explanations in the empirical literature (see Bradley and 
Sundaram (2004))
1. Among the available theoretical justifications, Jensen (2004) support the 
bidder overvaluation hypothesis and argue that high valuations increase managerial discretion, 
enabling managers to make poor acquisitions. Particularly, in stock swap acquisitions, bidders 
may manipulate their earnings leading the firm to exhibit signs of overvaluation. Accordingly, 
Erickson and Wang (1999) find that bidder managers manipulate earnings prior to the offer to 
overestimate the value of their firm. This is likely to reduce the acquisition costs. These 
authors argue that the market hardly perceives the increase of the expected benefits from the 
acquiring firm's perspective. Overall, most studies support the managerial economic incentive 
hypothesis as a motivation for accounting policy choices and show that managers are 
opportunistic on accounting choices. Particularly in an acquisition context, the market’s 
efficiency hypothesis may constitute support for the existence of earnings management. 
Indeed, this hypothesis provides an explanation to the post-acquisition underperformance 
(Louis, 2004). 
In order to increase accounting earnings, Erickson and Wang (1999) mention that managers 
have recourse to mechanisms of accelerating revenues collection, deferring expenses or use 
accounting procedure manipulations. Furthermore, Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggest that 
managers can defer expenditures (research and development (R&D), advertising, and 
maintenance), and choose accelerated depreciation or inventory valuation methods. Likewise, 
Hand and Kantz (1997) underline that investors perceive that firms have tax incentives to 
adopt LIFO when input prices rise. In reference to literature, we can note that several studies
2 
show that bidder managers manipulate earnings prior to the acquisition announcement, 
especially in the case of stock swap acquisition. However, few studies have investigated the 
determinants of discretionary accruals in a context of acquisition. 
                                                 
1 According to these authors, these assumptions must surely only be partial explanations of acquisition strategies. 
2 Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Easterwood (1998), Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis (2004), Baik et al. (2007), Botsari and Meeks (2008). 
  2This paper analyses the determinants of earnings management by the acquirer of 60 takeover 
bids that occurred between 1998 and 2008 on the French market. The French context is 
worthy to study given the rapid growth of mergers and acquisitions since the nineties. 
Besides, to our knowledge, no studies have examined the evidence and the determinants of 
bidder’s earnings management in France. Four findings are shown in this study. First, we find 
strong evidence that bidder firms manipulate earnings prior to takeovers either downward or 
upward and regardless of the method of payment. This suggests that target managers have 
incentive to detect earnings manipulation to ensure the interests of the target shareholders. 
Second, value bidders which acquire glamour target manage earnings upward prior to the 
acquisition. Third, bidder toehold impacts negatively and significantly the discretionary 
accruals. Lastly, the relationship between discretionary accruals and managerial ownership is 
negatively significant. This strategy favors a resource transfer to the bidder. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 highlights evidence on the 
existence of earnings management by the acquirer and presents the literature review on the 
determinants of earnings management by the bidder. Section 3 presents the sample and 
methodology, followed by the results and discussion in section 4. The last section concludes 
the paper. 
 
1. Literature review and hypotheses development 
This study examines earnings management by bidder firm in context of corporate takeover. 
We present hereafter, theoretical background and empirical work, with respect, first to 
evidence and motives of earnings management by acquirer, and second to the determinants of 
earnings management by acquirer. 
 
1.1.  Earnings management by the bidder: Evidence and motivation 
The aim of earnings management research is to detect managers' earnings manipulation 
measured by discretionary accruals. Most studies support the managerial economic incentives 
hypothesis as a motivation for accounting policy choices (see, Groff and Wright, 1989; 
Wright and Guan, 2004). According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), managers use judgment in 
financial reporting to mislead some stakeholders about the firm economic performance. 
Previous research show that managers are opportunistic on accounting choices 
(Subramanyam, 1996; Christie and Zimmerman, 1998; Eddey and Taylor, 1999) and have 
strong incentives to manage earnings to increase corporate managers' compensation and job 
  3security (Gaver et al. 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Indeed, their compensation is usually 
associated to firm performance. Managers try also to meet company and/or analyst’s 
consensus of earnings’ forecasts (Jensen, 2004)
3. Jiraporn (2005) reports that managers are 
inclined to present a positive picture to meet investors expectations. Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(2003) find that firms that receive "buy" recommendations are more likely to manage earnings 
to meet analysts' earnings expectations; whereas firms that receive "sell" recommendations 
are more inclined to show negative unexpected accruals.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that earnings management occurs when the costs of 
undoing earnings management exceed the costs of managing earnings. The market’s 
efficiency hypothesis may constitute a support for the existence of earnings management 
particularly in an acquisition context. Theoretically, this hypothesis provides an explanation to 
the post-acquisition underperformance in case of earnings management (Louis, 2004)
4. 
Following recent literature, we notice controversial results regarding bidder earnings 
management. Louis (2004) finds a significant negative relationship between discretionary 
accruals and abnormal returns in stock swap acquisition. Erickson and Wang (1999) show that 
bidder managers manipulate earnings upward to raise the market price which affect 
favourably the exchange ratio. Similarly, Easterwood (1998), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) and Botsari and Meeks, (2008) provide strong evidence that acquiring 
firms overstate their earnings reports prior to stock swap acquisition announcement by 
aggressively using discretionary accruals. Indeed, they show evidence of post-merger reversal 
price effects of the pre-merger earnings management. With respect to the cash acquisitions, 
Erickson and Wang (1999) show that acquiring firms do not manipulate earnings. In contrast, 
Pungaliya and Vijh (2009) provide robust evidence for an insignificant difference between 
discretionary accruals of cash and stock acquisitions. Using an industry adjusted change in 
earnings as a measure of earnings management, Wu (1997) find that managers manipulate 
earnings. Nonetheless, the author shows that bidder manager manipulates downward earnings 
prior to making an acquisition offer (see Perry and Williams, 1994; Le Nadant, 1999). 
Interestingly, Baik et al. (2007) analyze the estimation risk in the target valuation, and suggest 
that bidder manipulates earnings upward prior to the merger to avoid overpayment. Besides, 
the author points out that investors price the bidder’s earnings management at the time of the 
acquisition. In contrast to previous studies, Heron and Lie (2002) underline that, in the post-
                                                 
3The author document that managers are drawn into the game of ‘managing earnings’ with consensus earnings forecast. 
4 Interestingly, Gong et al. (2008) provide evidence that long-term market underperformance is specifically limited to litigated acquisitions.  
 
  4acquisition period, bidder firms experience significantly stronger operating performance than 
control firms with similar operating performance prior to the acquisition announcement. In 
Greece, Koumanakos et al. (2005) find weak evidence of biased accruals by the bidder in the 
year preceding the announcement and the completion of the deal. The discussion here leads to 
our first hypothesis: 
H1: French bidders manage their earnings prior to takeovers. 
 
1.2.  The determinants of bidder’s earnings management 
The extant literature about the existence of bidder earnings management is not conclusive. 
Indeed, several studies report that bidder managers manipulate their earnings. Others find no 
evidence that acquirers manage their earnings prior to acquisition. The analysis of the 
relationship between earnings manipulation and corporate acquisition characteristics is the 
main objective of our research. The determining factors developed by the empirical literature 
are presented below.  
 
1.2.1.  Managerial ownership  
A stream of literature documents that poor alignment of interests between management and 
shareholders leads managers to use discretionary accruals especially to increase earning-based 
compensations. Jensen (2004) assumes that high stock valuation increases managerial 
discretion
5 and that earning manipulation contributes to the overvaluation process. The latter 
generates agency costs of overvalued equity. However, hubris and overconfident managers’ 
behavior hypotheses suggest that managers do not seek to manipulate earnings (Roll, 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005). According to Louis (2004), managerial ownership is likely to 
align the incentives of the CEO and shareholders; and then affects earnings management 
(Louis (2004)). Empirically, Warfield et al. (1995) show a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. Contrasted results are found by Yeo, et al. 
(2002) and Gabrielsen et al. (2002). In a context of merger and acquisition, Erickson and 
Wang (1999) report that CEO manages earnings to minimize the likelihood of earnings 
dilution. They also try to reduce the dilution voting and control power of existing 
shareholders, particularly manager-shareholders. Consequently, they predict that bidder 
managers will increase accounting earnings prior to stock swap acquisition. However, the 
authors find that the relationship between discretionary accruals and bidder management 
                                                 
5 Overevaluation hypothesis support that managerial discretion enables CEO make poor acquisitions. 
  5ownership is not significant. In reference to this theoretical and empirical literature, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a relationship between managerial ownership and earnings manipulation prior 
to the acquisition. 
 
1.2.2.  Bidder’s toehold
6 
Controlling shareholders are defined by empirical studies
7 as owners with more than 10% of 
the capital. According to Betton and Eckbo (2000), there is a substantial theoretical support to 
the claim that the size of bidder toehold determines optimal bidding strategies. Therefore, 
investors may regard the presence of bidder toehold as a credible signal (signaling 
hypothesis
8)  that the takeover decision is driven by motives of profit maximization. 
According to Hamza (2009), as bidder toehold determines the number of shares necessary for 
the takeover, the size of bidder toehold is synonymous with bargaining power (demand-supply 
hypothesis
9), and affects the total operational and research cost of the target firm. Besides, the 
bid announcement increases the target shares value, and hence, those held by the controlling 
shareholders, who achieve private benefits
10. This tunneling mechanism benefits to bidder 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000). 
Moreover, the existence of a significant toehold often reveals the existence of an information 
asymmetry which allows bidder controlling shareholders to prevent earnings manipulation. In 
addition, bidder controlling shareholders may allow the target firm to make earnings 
management to generate private benefits (Thauvron (2000)). Based on this theoretical and 
empirical support, we predict that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between bidder toehold and earnings management prior 
to the acquisition. 
 
1.2.3.  Method of payment  
As reviewed by several studies
11, the market reaction to the announcement of equity offering 
is significantly negative. These studies support the signalling hypothesis and show that equity 
offering conveys negative information about bidder firm overvaluation. Recently, Heron and 
Lie (2002) show that acquiring firms experience negative abnormal returns around 
                                                 
6 The main developments of this issue are based from on work of hamza (2009). 
7 Claessens et al. (2000). 
8Leland and Pyle (1977).  
9 Walking (1985). 
10 Johnson et al. (2000),, Dyck et Zingales (2002). 
11 Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998)… 
  6announcements of stock-swap acquisitions and normal returns around cash acquisitions. The 
authors conclude that earnings management before stock-swap acquisitions is negatively 
associated to the operating performance in the post-acquisition period. Erickson and Wang 
(1999) argue that post-acquisition underperformance of the bidder is partly attributable to the 
reversal of the price effect resulting from pre-acquisition earnings management. Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that managers choose to artificially inflate 
earnings by using discretionary accruals. Most research explains that there are more 
incentives to manage earnings in stock swap acquisitions than in cash acquisitions. Erickson 
and Wang (1999) who find similar results, show that acquiring firms do not manipulate 
earnings in cash-financing acquisitions. Likewise, Easterwood (1998) find strong evidence 
suggesting that acquiring firms overstate their earnings reports in the quarter preceding a 
stock swap announcement. Recently, Botsari and Meeks (2008) confirm this finding and show 
evidence consistent with earnings management in share-financed bids. In the specific case of 
privately held target, Baik et al. (2007) find that the bidder firm is more likely to report 
income-increasing abnormal accruals when it uses stock. In contrast, Pungaliya and Vijh 
(2009) as well as Heron and Lie (2002), provide robust evidence for an insignificant 
difference between discretionary accruals of cash and stock swap acquisition. With regard to 
the existing works, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between stock swap financed acquisitions and earnings 
management prior to the acquisition 
 
1.2.4.  Book to market of the bidder Vs Book to market of the target  
The relative book to market ratio (bidder book to market divided by that of target) compares 
the bidder’s and the target’s growth potential and indicates the gap between the two firm’s 
profiles. When this ratio exceeds 1, this means that the “value bidders” may seek out a target 
with high growth opportunities. In the French context, Dumontier and Pecherot-Petitt (2002) 
and Hamza (2009) show that bidders with high book to market that acquire targets with weak 
one, experience substantial and significant gains. This finding is consistent with those of Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) in the US market. The latter argue that in glamour companies, bidder 
managers are more likely to overestimate their own abilities to manage an acquisition (i.e., 
they will be infected by hubris, Roll, 1986). According to Fama and French (1993), high level 
of book to market, as a systematic risk factor
12, indicates a distressed firm profile. Hence, 
bidder with high book to market acquiring a target with high growth opportunities has 
                                                 
12 See empirical evidence from the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. 
  7incentives to manipulate earnings (Jiraporn (2005)). These theoretical and empirical 
developments lead us to put forward the following hypothesis. 
H4: Value bidders which acquire glamour target manage earnings upward prior to the 
acquisition. 
 
1.2.5.  Relative deal size  
Erickson and Wang (1999) use the relative deal size as a proxy for the economic benefits 
from manipulating earnings. They find that bidder discretionary accruals are positively related 
to the relative deal size of the merger. The authors argue that if the target firm size is 
relatively small compared to the one of the acquiring firm, the economic benefits from 
increasing stock price via manipulated earnings will also be relatively small. Since earnings 
management is costly, small economic benefits reduce the incentives for the bidder to 
manipulate earnings. In contrast, the findings of Heron and Lie (2002) provide no evidence 
that the changes in operating performance are related to the relative deal size. Lastly, Siregar 
and Utama (2008) find no evidence relationship between bidder discretionary accruals and the 
deal size. Inasmuch that most studies suggest that the degree of earnings management is an 
increasing function of the relative deal size, we predict that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between relative deal size and earnings management 
prior to the acquisition.  
 
1.2.6.  Takeover premium  
The bid premium is the difference between the bid price and the prebid market price of the 
target firm. Louis (2004) underline that the premium paid over the target price is correlated 
with the market reaction at the announcement of the acquisition. As the acquirer pays a large 
premium, the market may consider that the bidder overpays the acquisition (Roll, 1986). A 
large premium is justified only if market investors expect high potential synergetic benefits 
from the acquisition (Morck et al., (1990)) which corroborate the acquirer-target information 
asymmetry hypothesis. Easterwood (1998) argues that increasing reported earnings enhance 
the bidder pre-offer market price which leads to a favorable takeover premium level. This 
means that positive forecasts are associated with a low level of takeover premium. Amel-
Zadeh et al. (2008) find evidence of systematic over-estimation of future earnings growth, 
despite the investor skepticism about management forecasts. They argue that bidding firms 
benefit from the market’s reaction subsequently to favorable earnings forecasts to acquire the 
target on better terms. There are some suggestions that the bidding executives use forecasts to 
  8convince target shareholders to accept a lower premium, which is beneficial to bidder 
shareholders (See Amel-Zadeh et al. 2008). Considering earnings management practices, 
managers are likely to manipulate their earnings upwardly to increase the earnings gains 
forecasts. Such situation leads the bidder to offer a small premium. The preceding discussion 
leads to our next hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative relation between the bid premium level and earnings management 
prior to the acquisition.  
 
3. Sample selection and variable measurement 
 
  3.1. Sample selection 
 
The takeover sample was extracted from the complete takeovers bid announced at the AMF 
(“Autorité des Marchés Financiers”) from January 1998 to December 2008. We started our 
study in 1998 because the AMF database provided complete data (deal information and 
synopsis). The initial sample includes 102 French takeovers. We eliminated 18 financial and 
banking firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) given that they have different financial, 
operating and risk characteristics. We also remove firms with missing financial data, those 
where the bidder is not a listed company and recently established bidders that have no 
financial and securities data. The final sample includes 60 French takeovers. Accounting and 
financial data were collected from Thomson One Banker database. Data on managerial 
ownership and share ownership of the bidder firm were hand-collected from annual reports 
and from takeover documents, which were located at the AMF website. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the studied takeovers across industries and the year the 
takeover was fulfilled. We use two-digit SIC Classification code based on Campbell (1996). 
The takeovers studied here stand for 11 industries. The most represented industry is the 
services sector with 18 firms (30% of the whole sample) followed by the consumer durable 
and basic industry with 15% of the total sampled takeovers each. Besides, the greatest 
concentration of takeovers in France was held in 2001 with 12 takeovers representing 20% of 
the sampled firms. It is followed by 9 takeovers that were completed in 2000. The remaining 







  9Table 1.  Sample distribution across industries and year of takeover 
Panel A:  Panel B: 
All sampled firms  Year  All sampled firms  SIC  Codes based on Campbell (1996) 
Number %   Number % 
Petroleum     13, 29    3  5  1999  7  11.66 
Consumer durable  25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57  9  15  2000  9  15 
Basic Industry  10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33  9  15  2001  12  20 
Food & Tobacco  1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54  3  5  2002  8  13.33 
Construction  15, 16, 17, 32, 52  2  3.33  2003  6  10 
Capital Goods  34, 35, 38  3  5  2004  1  1.67 
Transportation  40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47  1  1.67  2005  8  13.33 
Unregulated utilities  46, 48  3  5  2006  2  3.33 
Textile and Trade  22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59  4  6.67  2007  4  6,67 
Services  72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89  18  30  2008  3  5 
Leisure  27, 58, 70, 78, 79  5  8.33      
Total    60  100  Total  60  100 
 
  3.2. Variable measurement 
3.2.1. Measuring earnings management 
The extant literature deems discretionary accruals to be the main proxy for earnings 
management (see for example: Teoh et al. 1998). We use the modified version of Jones model 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) to assess discretionary accruals for the bidder. This model 
has been proved to be the most accurate one to detect earnings management. Discretionary 
accruals are calculated here, the year before the takeover and are computed using data from 
firms’ reported income statements.  
To measure discretionary accruals, we have first to calculate total accruals. These are 
accounting adjustments and a component of earnings with cash flows. They are composed of 
both discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the component of 
total accruals subject to manipulation because they require judgment and estimation of 
management. Nondiscretionary accruals are however applied in a regular basis and do not 
result from earning manipulation.  
We calculate total accruals in the current study using the cash flow approach. According to 
Collins and Hribar (1999), this approach is more accurate in computing total accruals than the 
balance sheet approach, which is a matter to significant measurement error in accruals. Total 
accruals are computed then as follows: 
TACCit = Net incomeit – Operating cash flowit  
Following Dechow et al. (1995), we remove components of accruals that are nondiscretionary 
(i.e. beyond the control of managers). Then, we assess discretionary accruals (DACC) as the 
difference between total accruals (TACC) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDACC). 
  10Nondiscretionary accruals are estimated from cross-sectional regressions of total accruals 
using the following OLS estimation:  
TACCit = a1(1/Ai,t-1) + a2(ΔREVit - ΔRECit) +a3PPEit + eit  
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Ai,t-1: the total assets of firm I in year t-1, 
TACCit = the total accruals of firm i in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, 
DREVit = the change in revenue of firm i in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, 
DRECit = the change in net receivable of firm i in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, 
PPEit = the gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t scaled by total assets in 
year t-1. 
Like prior studies, the variables change in revenues, net receivables and the gross property, 
plant and equipment are used to control for the expected components in total accruals 
(Erickson and Wang, 1999). All variables in the accruals model are scaled by lagged total 
assets to shrink heteroscedasticity (Jones, 1991).  
The estimates of a1, a2, and a3 obtained from these regressions are then used to compute 
nondiscretionary accruals:  
NDACCit = â1(1/Ai,t-1) + â2 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit) + â3 PPEit  
Finally, as we break down total accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components, 
the discretionary accruals are estimated by the difference between total accruals and the 
nondiscretionary accruals estimation as follows: 
DACCit = TACCit - NDACCit 
As managers have incentives to manage earnings upward and downward, we use the value of 
discretionary accruals in both directions.  
 
3.2.2. Measuring explanatory variables 
We present the explanatory variables of earnings management specific to takeover-context. 
We use the Relative deal size as the bidder total assets relative to target ones. Cash is equal to 
1 if the takeover is a cash acquisition and 0 if it is a stock swap acquisition. The value of the 
premium paid to target shareholders the day before the takeover and 6 months before are also 
introduced to capture earnings management motivations
13. To assess the influence of 
                                                 
13 Previous studies such as Varaiya and Ferris, (1987) evaluate the acquisition premium as the percentage difference between the final price 
paid to the target and the target  price 30 days prior to the first bid. Schwert (1996) underline that the price run-up associated with a takeover 
  11ownership structure on the incentive to manage bidder’s earnings, we introduce two different 
variables. Managerial ownership is the percentage of outstanding stocks of the bidder directly 
owned by management and directors the year prior to the acquisition. Toehold equals to the 
proportion of shares held by the bidder on the target firm prior to the offer. Finally, we use the 
relative book-to-market ratio which is the bidder’s book-to-market ratio scaled by the target 
one. All the explanatory variables definitions are provided in Table 3. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
We control for firm characteristics. The existing literature has shown the influence of some 
control variables on earnings management. We include firm size, firm performance, leverage 
and industry. 
Firm Size: The relationship between firm size and earnings management is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, Lobo and Zhou (2006) argue that large firms have incentives to increase the 
value of their earnings, because of their business activities are complex. This result was 
shown by previous research (see for e.g. Jo and Kim, 2007). On the second hand, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) suggest that large firms are exposed to high political costs because they 
are more subject to market coverage. This will lead managers to understate earnings (Bozec, 
2008). Bidder firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. We do not expect 
the sign of the variable coefficient. 
Profitability: Kasznik (1999) and Haw et al. (2004) show a positive relationship between 
earnings management and firm performance. In their model, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) 
suggest that managers are likely to decrease (increase) current earnings when they are high 
(low). Empirically, DeFond and Park (1997) show that accruals are negatively associated with 
current performance and positively associated with the next period’s performance. This is due 
to the fact that managers save income for future periods (through negative discretionary 
accruals). Profitability is measured by the return on assets ratio. We expect the relationship 
between earnings management and firm performance to be positive.  
Leverage: Becker et al. (1998) and DeFond and Park (1997) find that leverage is negatively 
associated with discretionary accruals. The relationship between leverage and discretionary 
accruals is explained by agency issues. As a controlling device, debt may influence the 
earnings manipulating behavior. However, according to Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), firms with high leverage are inclined to increase their accruals 
                                                                                                                                                         
occurs earlier than 30 days prior, he considers the premium as the variation between the final price paid to the target and the target price on 
day-40 relative to the first bid date. 
 
  12in order to avoid debt covenant violation. Leverage is the book value of non-equity liabilities 
divided by the book value of total assets. We make no prediction on the sign of the coefficient 
for this variable. 
Industry: Dummy variables for industry classification were introduced to control for industry 
effects. This variable controls differences in earnings management practices between sectors.  
Year: Year dummies were also introduced in our model to control for fixed year effects. We 
include 9 dummy variables for each year minus one.  
 
Table 2. Summary of variable definitions 
Variable name  Description 
 




The value of discretionary accruals by the bidder, the year before the 
acquisition 
A dummy variable coded as 1 if the discretionary accruals are 





The ratio of target size (i.e. total assets) scaled by the bidder size. 
Cash 
 
A dummy variable coded as 1 if the method of payment is cash and 
0 if it is by stock. 
Toehold  The percentage of shares held by the bidder on the target firm prior 
to the offer. 









The ratio of target’s book to market scaled by bidder’s book to 
market. 
The value of premium the day before the takeover announcement. 
The value of premium 6 months before the takeover announcement. 
The Log value of bidder’s total assets. 
The ratio of return on assets of the bidder (i.e. the net income 
divided by the total assets). 
The ratio of total debts on total assets of the bidder. 
 
 
4. Analysis and discussion 
  4.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics and presents firm characteristics based on the last fiscal 
year. Panel A displays the overall characteristics of the sampled takeovers. Panel B reports 
firm characteristics according to the method of payment (cash and stock swap acquisitions). 
The p-values of the Wilcoxon test that compares the characteristics of the bidders in stock 
swap takeovers relatively to cash takeovers are displayed in the right-hand side of the table. 
 
 
  13Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the discretionary accruals range from -0.33 to 0.62 and are 
significantly different from 0. This shows the presence of earnings management prior to 
French takeovers and that managers manipulate their earnings either downward or upward. 
This result is contrary to that of Heron and Lie (2002) who find no evidence of earnings 
management prior to acquisitions across the payment categories. Panel B of Table 4 also 
shows that, in stock swap acquisition context, discretionary accruals are positively and 
statistically different from 0 at the 1% level. This result is in line with those of Loughran and 
Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Easterwood (1998), Erickson and Wang (1999) and 
Botsari and Meeks (2008). Besides, we find that discretionary accruals are negatively and 
statistically different from 0 at the 1% level in the case of cash acquisition. This result is not 
consistent with those shown by the major work of literature. The latter provide robust 
evidence that acquiring firms do not manipulate earnings in cash-financing acquisitions. 
Overall, most research explains that there are more incentives to manage earnings in stock 
swap acquisitions than in cash acquisitions. Lastly, we underline that discretionary accruals 
are not significantly different between cash and stock swap acquisitions. This result is similar 
to that of Pungaliya and Vijh (2009). The French context presents the feature of bidder firms 
manipulating earnings both in stock swap acquisitions (29 acquisitions) and in cash 
acquisitions (31 acquisitions) and both upward (26 acquisitions) and downward (34 
acquisitions). 
 
Panel A of table 4 also shows that, on average, French bidders are reasonably indebted, with a 
slightly positive ROA, are larger than the target and offer a premium of approximately 15% 
relatively to the pre-announcement price of the target. In addition, the mean of bidder toehold 
(10.47%) as well as bidder management ownership (16.30%) are quite high and indicate an 
important power of control. Moreover, the averaged value of the book to market ratio of the 
bidder relatively to target’s one is of 1.12 suggesting that growth potential of the target is on 
average greater than that of the bidder. Otherwise, “value bidder” has incentives to acquire a 
“glamour target” which ensure an easy post-acquisition integration (Hamza, 2009). 
Panel B of table 4 shows that the averaged value of debts in cash acquisition (30.09%) is 
significantly higher than for sock takeovers (22.32%) which means that bidder may use debt 
to finance acquisition. In addition, the difference in mean test shows that bidder toehold is 
significantly higher for cash than for stock acquisition. This controlling block confirms the 
  14informational asymmetry hypothesis resulting from the payment method
14. Furthermore, we 
find no evidence that accruals are different across the two groups of firms. Besides, equity 
acquisitions do not pay higher premium than cash acquisitions. Overall, most of the 
explanatory variables are insignificantly discriminating factors in terms of method of 
payment. As shown by previous French studies (see Dumontier and Pécherot-Petitt, 2002; 
Hamza, 2009) the method of payment is not a significant determinant of the acquisition 
strategy.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics of continuous and nominal variables used in the current study. Accrual: is 
the value of discretionary accruals by the bidder the year before the acquisition. It is statistically different from 0 
at the 1% level either for cash or stock swap acquisitions. Dealsize is the relative size of the target on bidder size. 
Toehold is the percentage of shares held by the bidder on the target firm prior to the offer. MO is management 
ownership of the bidder. RelBTM is the ratio of target’s book to market on bidder’s book to market. Prem1day: 
is the value of premium one day before the takeover. Prem6months: is the value of premium 6 months before the 
takeover. Size: is the Log of bidder’s total assets. ROA is the return on assets. Leverage is the book value of non-
equity liabilities over the book value of total assets. Cash: equals 1 if the method of payment is cash and 0 
otherwise. 
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0.7525 


































                                                 
14 See Eckbo et al. (1990).  
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  4.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 4 provides Pearson correlations between explanatory variables. According to Gujarati 
(2004), a serious problem of multicolinearity exists when correlations between the 
independent variables exceed 0.80. The results in table 5 indicate that the strongest correlation 
is the one between the premium the day before the takeover and the one six months before. It 
is equal to 0.72 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is followed by firm size which 
is correlated with respectively, managerial ownership, the two values of premium, bidder 
toehold and profitability, with respectively 0.57, 0.37, 0.24, 0.23 and 0.24. The remaining 
correlations among explanatory variables are relatively weak and statistically insignificant at 
usual levels. We calculate the VIF to check the existence of multicolinearity problem. They 
range between 1.15 and 2.88 below the critical value of 10 (Neter et al. 1989). Thus, the 
correlations between the independent variables do not seem at the origin of the 
multicollinearity problem.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix  
This table provides the value of the correlations between each of the independent variables. Dealsize is the 
relative size of the target on bidder size. Cash: equals 1 if the takeover method of payment is cash and 0 
otherwise. Toehold is the percentage of shares held by the bidder on the target firm prior to the offer. 
PREM1day: is the value of premium one day before the takeover. PREM6months: is the value of premium 6 
months before the takeover. MO is management ownership of the bidder. Size: is the Log of bidder’s total assets. 
ROA is the return on assets. Leverage is the book value of non-equity liabilities over the book value of total 
assets. RelBTMis the ratio of target’s book to market on bidder’s book to market. ***, **, * denote two-tailed 
statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Dealsize Cash ToeholdPREM1day PREM6mt
h
MO Size ROA Leverage RelBTM VIF  
Dealsize  1 -0.029 0.034 -0.208 -0.165 -0.067 -0.114 0.170 0.178 0.000 1.23  
   0.828 0.795 0.111 0.208 0.611 0.387 0.195 0.173 0.997   
Cash  1 0.294** -0.059 0.138 -0.009 0.025 -0.055 0.218*  0.138 1.33  
    0.022 0.654 0.294 0.946 0.851 0.679 0.095 0.296   
Toehold   1 -0.166 0.044 -0.198 0.231* 0.130 0.009  -0.064 1.3  
    0.205 0.741 0.129 0.075 0.323 0.943  0.632   
PREM1day   1 0.72*** 0.119 0.244* 0.268** 0.058  0.153 2.88  
    0.000 0.365 0.060 0.038 0.661  0.249   
PREM6months   1 -0.107 0.37*** 0.210 0.058  0.078 2.63  
    0.418 0.003 0.107 0.657  0.555   
  16MO   1 -0.57*** -0.092 0.060  0.099 1.76  
    0.000 0.483 0.647  0.457   
Size   1 0.245* 0.102  0.117 1.97  
    0.059 0.440  0.379    
ROA   1 0.328  -0.332 1.41  
    0.011**  0.01***   
Leverage   1  -0.049 1.32  
      0.712   
RelBTM     11 . 1 5   
 
Mean comparison tests of discretionary accruals between two sub-samples separated 
according to bidder characteristics are reported in table 5. These characteristics are broken 
down according to whether they are above- or below- mean level for the sample. The 
univariate tests show that bidder firms with toehold are likely to manage their earnings prior 
to a takeover. These preliminary results confirm partially our hypotheses. 
 
Table 5. Univariate Tests 
Table 6 reports mean comparison tests of discretionary accruals between two groups of firms separated each 
time whether they are above- or below-mean levels for the sample. Two-tailed t-statistics from a parametric test 
and non parametric tests are also displayed. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of continuous and nominal 
variables used in the current study. Accrual: is the value of discretionary accruals by the bidder the year before 
the acquisition. Dealsize is the relative size of the target on bidder size. Cash: equals 1 if the takeover method of 
payment is cash and 0 otherwise. Toehold is the percentage of shares held by the bidder on the target firm prior 
to the offer. MO is management ownership of the bidder. RelBTMis the ratio of target’s book to market on 
bidder’s book to market. PREM1day: is the value of premium one day before the takeover. PREM6months: is 
the value of premium 6 months before the takeover. Size: is the Log of bidder’s total assets. ROA is the return on 










Dealsize Mean 0.724 0.7355 -0.056 0.941
Cash Mean 0.500 0.5294 -0.222 0.823
Toehold Mean 0.0734 0.1286 -1.720* 0.072*
PREM1day Mean 0.2842 0.1958 1.108 0.080*
PREM6months Mean 0.2159 0.2950 -1.050 0.488
MO Mean 0.1833 0.1428 0.599 0.240
Size Mean 6.4946 7.6484 -2.101** 0.040**
Profitability Mean 3.4961 -1.5506 1.320 0.602
Leverage Mean 0.2203 0.2963 -1.716* 0.041**
RelBTM Mean 0.8675 1.3133 -1.975** 0.060*
 
 
  4.3. Multivariate analysis and discussion 
  17Table 6 shows the regression results of accruals on the explanatory variables. These results 
indicate that toehold and discretionary accruals are negatively and significantly associated. 
This finding shows that in a takeover context, bidder firms are inclined to manipulate their 
earnings downward when their toehold is important. A large bidder toehold exacerbates 
information asymmetry and agency costs due to conflicts of interests between blockholders 
and minority shareholders of bidder firm. We suggest that bidder controlling shareholders 
have incentives to manipulate downward earnings to increase the share’s target value and then 
his toehold value. This situation leads to a resources transfer to bidder controlling 
shareholders. In this case, private benefits are measured by the block premium for the bidder 
blockholders. Our finding supports the information asymmetry hypothesis (Leland and Pyle 
(1977), Myers and Maljuf (1984)) and the tunneling hypothesis (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). 
This result corroborates our first hypothesis that the bidder’s toehold influences negatively the 
earnings management decision prior to the acquisition. 
Table 7 also shows that the relationship between discretionary accruals and managerial 
ownership is negatively significant. This result indicates that managers of bidder firms with 
large ownership stake do not benefit from the opportunity of bidder equity overvaluation. Our 
findings are in line with those of Warfield et al. (1995) and Siregar and Utama (2008) in other 
context than takeover. The acquisition context does not appear to affect the manager's 
behavior that hold ownership stake and meet the theoretical prescriptions. In reference to the 
previous result, managers, as controlling shareholders act as blockholders. Our results are in 
accordance with the agency theory which states that management ownership is an important 
device that align management interests with shareholder’s ones (Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999).. 
Our results provide strong evidence that the relative book to market ratio is significantly and 
negatively related to discretionary accruals. In other words, value bidders which acquire 
glamour target manage earnings upward prior to the acquisition. This finding confirms our 
hypothesis proposed above (H4). Similarly, Louis (2004) as well as Skinner and Sloan (2002) 
note that Book-to market is likely to be correlated with bidder accruals. Dumontier and 
Pecherot-Petitt (2002) and Hamza (2009) show that value bidders which acquiring glamour 
targets incur high gains that may be explained by bidder earnings management. We also 
notice that Dealsize and cash are not significantly associated to earnings management. Our 
hypotheses that the relative size and the method of payment are related to earnings 
  18managements are then not supported. Indeed, previous French research
15 show that the 
method of payment is not considered as a determinant factor of the acquisition strategy. 
Lastly, we don’t find a significant correlation between the acquisition premium and the bidder 
accruals, both in the model with premium the day before the announcement of the takeover 
and in the one with premium 6 months before. 
As for control variables, large firms are less inclined to manage their earnings. Political costs 
incurred by these firms prevent them from manipulating their earnings. This result is 
consistent with previous literature arguing that managers are likely to manipulate upwardly 
their earnings in case of large firms. Indeed, given the transparency of these firms, earnings 
management is more likely to be detected in large firms than in small firms (Bozec, 2008).  
Performing firms are the one that manipulate their earnings. The relationship between the 
ratio of net income on total assets and discretionary accruals is positive and statistically 
significant. This result is in line with those of Kasznik (1999) and Haw et al. (2004).  
 
Table 7. Multivariate analysis 
All the regressions in table 6 are run using an ordinary least squares specification. The dependent variable is 
Accrual: it equals to the value of discretionary accruals by the bidder the year before the acquisition. Dealsize is the 
relative size of the target on bidder size. Cash: equals 1 if the method of payment is cash and 0 otherwise. Toehold 
is the percentage of shares held by the bidder on the target firm prior to the offer. MO is management ownership of 
the bidder. RelBTMis the ratio of target’s book to market on bidder’s book to market. PREM1day: is the value of 
premium one day before the takeover. PREM6months: is the value of premium 6 months before the takeover. Size: 
is the Log of bidder’s total assets. ROA is the return on assets. Leverage is the book value of non-equity liabilities 
over the book value of total assets. The value of the t-test is in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Accrual 
  Eq1    Eq2   
Dealsize   -0.00857  (-0.35)  -0.01692  (-0.68) 
        
Cash  -0.01037  (-0.26)  -0.00456  (-0.11) 
        
Toehold  -0.17338  (-1.75)*  -0.21514  (-2.21)** 
        
MO  -0.17415  (-2.43)***  -0.14194  (-1.84)* 
        
PREM1day  0.08563  (1.22)    
        
PREM6Month     -0.03464  (-0.83) 
        
RelBTM 
 
-0.03519  (-2.54)***  -0.03958  (-2.90)*** 
Size  -0.02095  (-2.70)***  -0.01474  (-1.70)* 
        
ROA  0.001616  (1.28)  0.002172  (1.78)* 
                                                 
15 See Dumontier and Pécherot-Petitt (2002), Hamza (2009). 
  19        
Leverage  -0.13487  (-1.46)  -0.15134  (-1.63) 
        
Constant  0.254043  (3.83)***  0.250223  (3.54)*** 
        
Adjusted R²   25.46%    23.88%   
F value  3.79***    3.07***   
Observations  60    60   
 
  4.4. Robustness check 
We address here a robustness issue by performing a sensitivity analysis. We repeat the 
analysis after using a different dependent variable. The regressions use a binary variable that 
equals to 1 if discretionary accruals are positive and 0 if they are negative.  
The Logit regression results reported in table 8 show that the negative influence of leverage 
on earnings management is now statistically significant. This result shows that highly 
leveraged firms manage downward earnings in order to avoid debt covenant violation and 
then benefit from better debt contract terms as confirmed by DeAngelo et al. (1994). This 
finding is also consistent with Becker et al. (1998) and DeFond and Park (1997) and supports 
agency theory issues that debt is considered as a controlling device that may influence 
earnings manipulation. Signs and significance levels of the other independent variables are 
not affected by using a binary dependent variable. Conclusions remain then qualitatively 
similar to previous ones. 
 
Table 8. Robustness analysis 
Table 8 presents the logit regressions. The dependent variable is AccrualBin: it equals if the discretionary 
accruals are positive and 0 otherwise. Dealsize is the relative size of the target on bidder size. Cash: equals 1 if 
the method of payment is cash and 0 otherwise. Toehold is the percentage of shares held by the bidder on the 
target firm prior to the offer. MO is management ownership of the bidder. RelBTMis the ratio of target’s book to 
market on bidder’s book to market. PREM1day: is the value of premium one day before the takeover. 
PREM6months: is the value of premium 6 months before the takeover. Size: is the Log of bidder’s total assets. 
ROA is the return on assets. Leverage is the book value of non-equity liabilities over the book value of total 
assets. The value of the t-test is in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: AccrualBin 
  Eq1    Eq2   
Dealsize   -0.33950  (-0.86)  -0.49581  (-1.09) 
      
Cash  0.46811  (0.64)  0.56545  (0.81) 
      
Toehold  -2.1173  (-0.98)  -2.7675  (-1.89)* 
      
MO  -2.2921  (-1.70)*  -1.1848  (-0.71) 
      
PREM1day  1.3440  (1.08)    
      
  20PREM6Month     -1.3876  (-1.33) 
      
RelBTM 
 
-0.43901  (-1.75)*  -0.45141  (-1.90)* 
Size  -0.58907  (-2.98)***  -0.42575  (-2.15)** 
      
ROA  0.06676  (2.03)**  0.09301  (2.78)*** 
      
Leverage  -4.6273  (-1.69)*  -5.123  (-1.75)* 
      
Constant  5.7533  (3.42)***  5.3351  (3.14)*** 
      
Pseudo R²   24.13%    24%   
Wald chi2  19.23***    17.95***   
Observations  60    60   
 
  215. Conclusion and implications 
The corporate acquisition wave observed in France between 1998 and 2008 was characterized 
by friendly offers and horizontal acquisition strategies. We underline that French bidders are 
reasonably indebted, with a slightly positive ROA, are larger than the target and offer a 
premium of approximately 15%. In addition, bidder toehold as well as bidder management 
ownership are quite high and indicate an important power of control.  
The aim of our study is to investigate, from January 1998 to December 2008, the existence 
and the determinants of bidder’s earnings management in France. We provide evidence about 
earnings management by the acquirer prior to French takeovers and that managers manipulate 
their earnings either downward or upward regardless of the method of payment. We also 
investigate the determinants of earnings management by the acquirer. Our results show robust 
evidence that bidder toehold impacts negatively and significantly the discretionary accruals. 
We suggest that bidder controlling shareholders have incentives to manipulate downward 
earnings to increase the share’s target value and then his toehold value. This strategy favors a 
resource transfer to the bidder and consequently leads controlling shareholders to increase 
their participation prior to the offer. In other side, market investors have to trade target shares 
to realize significant gains. Besides, the relationship between discretionary accruals and 
managerial ownership is negatively significant. Hence, we observe the same behavior as of 
the other controlling shareholder and confirm the alignment hypothesis. Furthermore, our 
findings show that value bidders which acquire glamour target manage earnings upward prior 
to the acquisition.  
In reference to our empirical results, target firm's management has to evaluate the acquirer's 
financial statements to detect earnings manipulation, despite the costs of detection. As 
documented by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), this ensures the interests of the target 
shareholders by requiring a higher premium or threatening to cancel the transaction. The 
target firm may also operate an increase in reported earnings which will lead to an increase in 
the takeover premium required and hence, discourage the bidder. Future research may focus 
on the discretionary accruals as a determinant of the bid premium. Finally, under what 
conditions do market participants detect and, therefore, react to earnings management, and 
under what conditions do they fail to detect earnings management? Future research could also 
compare bidder performance post-acquisition relative to their industry to examine the reversal 
of the stock price effects of the pre-acquisition earnings management.  
 
  22References 
 
 
Abarbanell, J. and R. Lehavy, 2003, “Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and 
analysts' earnings forecast errors?” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 41, pp. 1-31.  
Amel-Zadeh A., O. Evans and G. Meeks, 2008, “Forecasts of earning by takeover bidders”, Social 
Science Research Network. 
Aggarwal R K and A. Samwick, 1999, “Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative 
Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Finance, vol. 54, pp. 1999-2043. 
Baik B., J-K Kang, and R. M. Morton, 2007, “Earnings management in Takeovers of Privately Held 
Targets”, Social Science Research Network. 
Becker, C.L., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam, 1998, The effect of audit quality 
on earnings management, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 15, pp. 1-24 
Betton S. And B.E. Eckbo, 2000, “Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in takeovers”, The 
Review of Financial Studies; Vol.13, pp. 841-882. 
Botsari A. and G. Meeks, 2008, “Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Prior to a Share for Share Bid?”, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 35, pp. 633-670. 
Bozec Y., 2008, «  Concentration de l'actionnariat, séparation des droits de vote et des droits de 
propriété : une étude empirique cacadienne», Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 
Bradley M. and A. Sundaram, 2004, “Do Acquisitions Drive Performance or Does Performance Drive 
Acquisitions? », Social Science Research Network. 
Campbell, J.Y., 1996, “Understanding risk and return”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, pp. 
298–345. 
Christie, A. A., and J. L. Zimmerman, 1994, "Efficient and Opportunistic Choices of Accounting 
Procedures: Corporate Control Contests," The Accounting Review, vol. 69, 4, pp. 539-566. 
Claessens S., S. Djankov, et LHP Lang, 2000, « The separation of ownership and control in east asian 
corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol 52, pp. 81-112. 
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney, 1995, "Detecting Earnings Management," The 
Accounting Review, vol. 70, pp. 193-225.  
Defond, M., J. Jiambalvo, 1994, “Debt Covenant Effects And The Manipulation of 
Accruals”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 17, pp. 145-176. 
DeFond, M., Park, C., 1997, “Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 115-139 
Dumontier, P., and B. S. Pecherot-Petitt, 2002, “Determinants of returns of acquiring firms around 
tender offer announcements: Evidence from French control-oriented and parent-subsidiary offers”, 
Social Science Research Network. 
Dyck I. J. A. and L. Zingales, 2004, “Private benefits of control: An international Comparison”, The 
Journal of Finance, vol 41, pp. 537-600.  
Easterwood, C. M., 1998, “Takeovers And Incentives For Earnings Management: An Empirical 
Analysis”, Journal of Applied Business Research, vol. 14, pp. 29-47. 
Eddey, Peter H., Taylor, Stephen L., 1999, “Directors' Recommendations on Takeover Bids and the 
Management of Earnings: Evidence from Australian Takeovers.” Abacus, vol. 35, pp. 29-45. 
Erickson, M. and S. Wang, 1999, « Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in Stock for Stock 
Mergers», Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 27, pp. 149-176. 
Fama E. F. and K. R. French, 1993, “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 33, pp 3-56. 
Fudenberg, K., and J. Tirole, 1995, “A theory of income and dividend smoothing based on 
incumbency rents, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103, pp. 75-93 
Gabrielsen, G., Gramlich, J. and Plenborg, T., 2002, “Managerial Ownership, Information Content of 
Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non-US Setting”, Journal of Business, Finance and 
Accounting, vol. 29, pp. 967–988. 
  23Gaver, J. J., K. M. Gaver, and J. R. Austin, 1995, “Additional evidence on bonus plans and income 
management”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 19, pp. 3-28. 
Gong G., H. Louis and A. Sun, 2008b, “Earnings management, lawsuits, and stock-for-stock 
acquirer’s market performance”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 46, pp. 62-77. 
Groff, J. E. and C. J. Wright, 1989, «The Market for Corporate Control and its Implications for 
Accounting Policy Choice», Advances in Accounting, vol. 7, pp. 3-21. 
Gujarati, D., 2004, “Basic Econometrics”, 4th edition, Montréal: McGraw-Hill Publishers. 
Hamza T., 2009, “Determinants of short-term value creation for the bidder: Evidence from France”, 
Journal of management and Governance. 
Hand J. R. M. and T. R. Skantz, 1997, “The economic determinants of accounting choices: The unique 
case of equity carve-outs under SAB 51”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 24, pp. 175-203. 
Haw, I., Hu, B., Hwang, L., W. Wu. (2004) “Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal 
and Extra-Legal Institutions”, Journal of Accounting Research 
Healy, P.M. and Wahlen, J.M., 1999, "A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting", American Accounting Association, Accounting Horizons, vol. 13, 
pp. 365-83. 
Heron R. and E. Lie, 2002, “Operating Performance and the Method of Payment in Takeovers”, The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 37, pp. 137-155. 
Jensen, M. C., 1986, “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers”, American 
Economic Review, vol. 76, pp. 323-339. 
Jensen, M. C., 2004, “The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate 
Finance », European Financial Management, vol. 10, pp. 549–565 
Jiraporn P., 2005, “An empirical analysis of corporate takeover defences and earnings management: 
evidence from the US”, Applied Financial Economics, vol. 15, pp. 293–303. 
Jo, H., and Y. Kim, 2007, “Disclosure frequency and earnings management”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 561-590. 
Johnson S. R., La Porta F., Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 2000, “Tunneling”, American Economic 
Review, vol. 90, pp. 22-27.  
Jones, J. J., 1991, "Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations," Journal of Accounting 
Research, vol. 29, pp. 193-228.  
Kasznik R. 1999, “On the Association Between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings 
Management”, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 37, pp. 57-81. 
Koumanakos E., C. Siriopoulos,  A. Georgopoulos, 2005, “Firm acquisitions and earnings 
management: evidence from Greece”, Managerial Auditing Journal. vol. 20, pp. 663-78.  
Leland. H., D. Pyle, 1977,  “Informational Asymmetries, Financial structure and Financial 
Intermediation”, Journal of Finance, vol. 32, pp. 371-387. 
Le Nadant, A. L., 1999, «La gestion des résultats comptables précédant les opérations de LBO 
françaises», Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit, vol.2, pp. 61-82. 
Lobo G., J. Zhou, 2001, “Disclosure quality and earnings management”, Working Paper, University of 
Houston 
Louis, H. (2004), "Earnings management and the market performance of acquiring firms", Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 74, pp. 121-48. 
Loughran, T., and A. Vijh, 1997, "Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions?" 
Journal of Finance, vol. 52, pp. 1765-1790. 
Malmendier U. And G. Tate (2005b): «CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment», Journal of 
Finance, vol. 60, pp. 2661-2700. 
Morck, R., Schleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1990, “Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?” 
Journal of Finance, vol. 45, pp. 31-48. 
Myers S.C. and Majluf N.S., 1984, “Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.49, pp.223-53. 
Neter J., Wasserman W., Kunter M.H., 1989, “Applied Linear Regression Models”, 2nd edition, Irwin, 
Homewood, IL. 
Perry, S. E. and T. H. Williams, 1994, «Earnings Management Preceding Management Buyout 
Offers» Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 18, pp. 157-179. 
  24  25
Pungaliya R.S. and A.M. Vijh, 2009, “Do Acquiring Firms Manage Earnings?” Social Science 
Research Network. 
Rau R. and T. Vermaelen, 1998, “Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring 
firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 49, pp 223-253. 
Roll R., 1986, “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”. The Journal of Business, vol. 59, pp. 
197-216. 
Siregar S. V. and S. Utama, 2008, “Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership 
structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia”, The International 
Journal of Accounting, 2008, vol. 43, pp. 1-27 
Skinner, D. and R. Sloan. 2002, “Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or 
Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio”, Review of Accounting Studies, vol. 7, pp. 289-
312. 
Subramanyam K. R., 1996, “The pricing of discretionary accruals”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, vol. 22, pp. 249-281  
Schwert W. G., 1996, “Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 41, pp. 153-192. 
Teoh, S.H., I. Welch and T. J. Wong, 1998, "Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market 
Performance of Initial Public Offerings", Journal of Finance, vol. 53, pp. 1935-1974. 
Thauvron, A, 2000, «La manipulation du résultat comptable avant une offre publique» Comptabilité 
Contrôle Audit, vol. 2, pp. 97-114. 
Varaiya N. P. and K. R. Ferris, 1987, “Overpaying in corporate takeovers: The winner’s curse”, 
Financial Analysts' Journal, pp. 64-70. 
Walking, R. A., 1985, “Predicting tender offer success: A logistic analysis,” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, vol. 4, pp. 461-478.  
Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J. and Wild, K. L., 1995, “Managerial ownership, accounting choices and 
informativeness of earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 20, pp. 61–92. 
Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L. (1990), "Positive accounting theory: a ten-year perspective", The 
Accounting Review, vol. 65, pp. 131-56. 
Wright C. J. and L. Guan., 2004, “Corporate Control and Earnings Management: Evidence from 
MBOs”, Managerial Finance, vol. 30, pp. 45-62. 
Wu, Y.W. (1997), "Management buyouts and earnings management", Journal of Accounting Auditing 
& Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 373-89. 
Yeo G.H.H, P.M.M Tan, K.W. Ho and S. Chen, 2002, “Corporate ownership structure and the 
informativeness of earnings”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 29, pp. 1023-1046. 
 
 